In depth

The Berlin Blockade and Airlift

An in-depth examination of the Berlin Blockade of 1948 to 1949, first major crisis of the Cold War, and the remarkable airlift that sustained West Berlin for nearly a year.

The Berlin Blockade and Airlift of 1948 to 1949 was the first sustained military crisis of the Cold War. It began on June 24, 1948, when Soviet forces sealed every road, rail line, and canal into the western sectors of Berlin. It ended on May 12, 1949, when the Soviets quietly lifted the blockade after Western aircraft had delivered 2.3 million tons of supplies to a city of 2.5 million people. Nothing was solved. Two German states emerged from the wreckage: the Federal Republic in May 1949, the German Democratic Republic in October. The Cold War in Europe had its first front line.

The immediate cause was currency. On June 20, 1948, the Western powers introduced the Deutsche Mark in their zones, including West Berlin, to break the ruinous postwar inflation. Stalin saw this as the opening shot in a Western campaign to freeze the division of Germany in place. His response was calibrated. Cutting West Berlin off by land was a deliberate test of American resolve, but it stopped short of a direct military confrontation. As Norman Naimark shows in The Russians in Germany (1995), Stalin expected the West to fold, not fly.

The geography made the gamble plausible. Berlin sat 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, connected to the West only by narrow corridors through Soviet-controlled territory. Once Stalin closed those corridors, the city was an island. The Western options were stark: withdraw, fight, or supply the city from the air. President Truman chose air. General Lucius D. Clay, the American military governor, pushed hardest for the plan over the objections of the Joint Chiefs, who doubted it could work.

Operation Vittles (American) and Operation Plainfare (British) began on June 26, 1948. Within months, the C-54 Skymaster, capable of lifting about ten tons, became the workhorse. Aircraft landed at Tempelhof in the American sector and at Gatow in the British sector; a third field, Tegel, was built from scratch during the operation, largely by a workforce that included the German Democratic Republic’s future chancellor. At the April 1949 peak, an aircraft touched down at Tempelhof every sixty-two seconds. The airlift was, in the judgment of the historian Ann Tusa, the greatest single air operation in the history of the world to that point.

The cost was real. Seventy-eight American and twenty-four British airmen died in crashes and accidents, Berlin authorities counted roughly 101 total Allied deaths. The city itself ran short of everything; the Western powers deliberately cut back on bulky items like coal in summer to reserve capacity for the leaner winter months. By the spring of 1949, however, the daily tonnage was exceeding pre-blockade levels — the ration each Berliner received averaged about 3,300 calories per day.

Stalin lifted the blockade in May 1949 because the operation had failed politically. The Western public rallied behind the airlift; the Soviet Union was portrayed in much of the world as blockading a civilian population. The Politburo also worried about the appearance of an imminent NATO — which was, in fact, signed on April 4. The lifting of the blockade bought the Soviets almost nothing. The Federal Republic was founded eleven days later.

The long-term consequences were defining. The airlift established the credibility of the American security guarantee in Europe, on which NATO’s continued existence has rested ever since. It hardened the division of Germany. And it gave the West an early propaganda victory whose memory still shapes how Berliners think of the Cold War — as a period of siege, of defiance, and of survival against the odds. For the immediate background of four-power occupation, and for the longer arc of European confrontation, see the linked treatments.

Key sources

  • Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Harvard University Press, 1995).
  • Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade (Bodley Head, 1988).
  • Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (HarperCollins, 1991), for the airlift’s place in the longer arc of East–West confrontation.